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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In a series of articles published from 1980 to 1992, literary theorists 
Steven Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels advocated what I will call 
“strong intentionalism,” the thesis that the meaning of a text is identical 
to the meaning that its author intended it to communicate.1  At the recent 
Conference on Legal Interpretation in San Diego, they vigorously defended 
this thesis.  I will argue that their defense of strong intentionalism fails, 
and that the thesis is false. 
 *  Professor of Law, Monash University, Australia. 
 1. The thesis and all the arguments considered throughout this Paper apply 
equally to sounds and gestures, as well as marks, that might be thought to be meaningful.  
It is merely for the sake of convenience that I will examine the relevant issues mainly by 
discussing texts, authors, and readers. 




Knapp and Michaels defend strong intentionalism mainly by arguing 
that there can be no such thing as “intentionless meaning,” in other 
words, that nothing can be meaningful which was not intended by some 
purposeful intelligence to be meaningful.  That argument has been subjected 
to powerful criticism, but I will assume that it is sound.2  My objection is 
that it does not establish strong intentionalism in any event.  At best, the 
argument proves that intention is a necessary condition for meaning.  It 
does not prove that it is a sufficient condition.  I will argue that intention 
alone is not sufficient for a text to be meaningful—something else is 
needed as well—and that consequently, intention and meaning are not 
identical. 
Against strong intentionalism I will defend “moderate intentionalism,” 
which holds that authorial intention is necessary but not sufficient for 
textual meaning.  Moderate intentionalists hold that an author may 
intend his text to mean something, but fail to give it that, or perhaps any, 
meaning.  For a text to mean what its author intended it to mean, it is 
necessary that its intended audience be capable of ascertaining its 
intended meaning.  This requires that the audience have access to persuasive 
evidence of that meaning, provided partly by the conventional meaning 
of the text and partly by other clues of the author’s intention, such as the 
context in which it was written.  If the audience does not have access to 
such evidence, then not only will the author’s attempt to communicate 
his intention fail, but the text will not mean what he intended it to mean.  
And that is to say that his intention alone is neither sufficient for, nor 
identical to, the meaning of the text. 
II.  THREE THEORIES OF MEANING 
Someone attempting to interpret a text is attempting to ascertain its 
meaning.  Philosophers and linguists distinguish between different kinds 
of meanings, although they disagree over how many there are and what 
they should be called.  Which of these kinds of meaning should 
interpreters be attempting to reveal?  To facilitate discussion, I will use 
the following labels: 
Conventionalism, or nonintentionalism, is the thesis that the true 
meaning of a text is constituted by its sentence meaning.  Sentence 
meaning is the meaning a sentence in a language has by itself, 
excluding all information about the context or contexts in which 
it is uttered.3  In other words, it is the meaning it derives solely 
 2. For criticism, see, for example, John R. Searle, Literary Theory and Its 
Discontents, 25 NEW LITERARY HIST. 637 (1994). 
 3. Knapp and Michaels might object that nothing can have a meaning by itself, 
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from the semantic and syntactic conventions of the language in 
question, and it is therefore independent of its author’s intentions. 
Strong intentionalism is the thesis that the true meaning of a text 
is its speaker’s meaning.  Speaker’s meaning is the meaning that 
the utterer of a sentence intends his utterance of it to 
communicate, which may be quite different from its sentence 
meaning. 
Moderate intentionalism is the thesis that the true meaning of a 
text is its utterance meaning.  Utterance meaning is what the 
speaker’s meaning appears to be, given all the evidence that is 
readily available to his intended audience, which may include the 
sentence meaning of the utterance and other clues such as its 
context. 
What is the practical difference between strong and moderate 
intentionalism?  Strong intentionalists hold that a text means what its 
author intended it to mean.  But obviously no one except the author 
herself has direct, unmediated access to her intentions.  Others must rely 
on whatever evidence of her intentions is available to them.  How, then, 
does this differ from moderate intentionalism?  The difference is that 
moderate intentionalists regard only a certain kind of evidence of an 
author’s intention as relevant to the meaning of her text.  The evidence 
must have been readily available to her intended audience. 
Suppose that on the basis of all the evidence readily available to them, 
both textual and contextual, members of the speaker’s intended audience 
interpret her text to mean x, but much later it is discovered by her 
biographer that she wrote in her private diary that she intended the text 
to mean y.  Is the meaning of the text x or y?  Assume that there is 
enough other evidence to justify accepting the reliability of the diary 
entry.  Moderate intentionalists, who take textual meaning to be utterance 
meaning, would say that the meaning of the text is x, notwithstanding the 
discovery of the diary entry, because evidence of the author’s intention 
which is not readily available to her intended audience is irrelevant.  But 
considered apart from any context of utterance, derived solely from linguistic 
conventions.  Nothing that has not actually been uttered can have any meaning, and 
linguistic conventions contribute to meaning only if a speaker or author intended them to 
do so.  To avoid that objection, let me stipulate that by “sentence” I mean words uttered 
with the intention that they mean something.  I am therefore not using the term “sentence 
meaning” in its usual philosophical sense. 




strong intentionalists, who take textual meaning to be speaker’s 
meaning, would say that the meaning of the text is y, and that readers 
prior to the biographer’s discovery misinterpreted it. 
Another example of the practical difference between strong and 
moderate intentionalism can be found in law, which Knapp and Michaels 
have often discussed.  When interpreting a statute, British courts traditionally 
refused to consider, as evidence of its intended meaning, what was said 
in parliamentary debates during its passage.4  They regarded this 
information as irrelevant to the meaning of the statute, partly because it 
was not readily available to the general public or even to most lawyers.  
On the other hand, they were always willing to take into account the 
circumstances in which the statute was passed, and its purpose, in so far 
as these are, or were at that time, common knowledge.5  They were 
moderate intentionalists rather than conventionalists.  Now, if they had 
adopted strong intentionalism, they might still have refused to consider 
what was said in parliamentary debates as evidence of statutory 
meaning, but not for the same reason.  They might have rejected it on the 
ground that it is unreliable as evidence of the legislature’s intended 
meaning, but not on the ground that it is in any event irrelevant to the 
meaning of the statute because it is not readily available to the 
legislature’s intended audience. 
III.  STRONG VERSUS MODERATE INTENTIONALISM 
Knapp and Michaels defend intentionalism against conventionalism. 
“All our arguments,” they say, “have been anti-conventionalist—which 
is to say, intentionalist.”6  Indeed, they think that the truth of intentionalism 
follows from the falsity of conventionalism: “Our insistence in ‘Against 
Theory’ that language is always intentional is no more than the positive 
side of the denial that preexisting forms, rules, or conventions are 
essential conditions of language.”7  But although they distinguish “strong 
conventionalism” from “moderate conventionalism,”8 they overlook the 
 4. American courts followed this approach until the twentieth century, when they 
began to admit such evidence.  In Pepper v. Hart, [1993] 1 All E.R. 42 (H.L.), British 
courts finally followed suit. 
 5. See, e.g., ELMER A. DRIEDGER, CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 149–51 (2d ed. 
1983); P. ST. J. LANGAN, MAXWELL ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 48 (12th ed. 
1969); SIR PETER BENSON MAXWELL, ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 20–21 
(photo. reprint 1991) (1875). 
 6. Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, Against Theory 2: Hermeneutics and 
Deconstruction, 14 CRITICAL INQUIRY 49, 67 (1987); see also id. at 60. 
 7. Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, A Reply to Richard Rorty: What Is 
Pragmatism?, in AGAINST THEORY: LITERARY STUDIES AND THE NEW PRAGMATISM 139, 
145 n.1 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed., 1985); see also Knapp & Michaels, supra note 6, at 67. 
 8. Knapp & Michaels, supra note 6, at 67. 
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existence of rival versions of intentionalism, and erroneously assume 
that strong intentionalism is the only alternative to conventionalism.9
One indication of this assumption is that Knapp and Michaels treat 
speaker’s meaning and utterance meaning as identical, which is a common 
failing in the philosophical literature as well.10  For example, after discussing 
an example of a speaker unintentionally misleading his audience, they 
deny that it is an instance of “a speaker failing to mean what the speaker 
intends.”11  And of course it is not: what a speaker means simply is, as 
they claim, what the speaker intends.  But the question is whether or not 
a speaker’s utterance can fail to mean what the speaker intends. 
Knapp and Michaels concede that what is essential to meaning is 
“giving clues to your intention,” or “signaling what you intend.”12  But 
what if a speaker fails to give accurate clues, or signals, of his intention?  
Is the meaning of his utterance still the meaning he intended it to have, 
or the meaning it appears to his intended audience to have, given the 
clues and signals he has provided?  Knapp and Michaels insist that it is 
the former.  But that seems to be due to their assumption that the only 
alternative to strong intentionalism is conventionalism—that if meaning 
is not determined by the speaker’s intention, it must be determined by 
linguistic conventions. 
Consider the following passage: 
Conventions are indeed important, but only because they often provide 
convenient ways of signaling what you intend.  They don’t add to, subtract 
from, or alter your meaning; they simply help you express the meaning you 
intend.  And if the conventions don’t help you express the meaning you 
intend—if, for example, you use the wrong conventions—they don’t replace 
your meaning with some other meaning.  Your meaning doesn’t become a 
different meaning when you fail to express the meaning you intended.  If it did, 
if speech acts were indeed conventional acts and not just acts that sometimes 
employed conventions, then Derrida would be right: intention would be 
inadequate to determine meaning.  But Derrida is wrong.  Speech acts are not 
conventional acts, and if they mean anything at all they mean only what their 
authors intend.13
 9. “The only alternative to the intentionalism of ‘Against Theory’ is a formalism 
that imagines the possibility not of two different kinds of intended meaning but of 
meaning that is not intended at all.”  Knapp & Michaels, supra note 7, at 142. 
 10. For honorable exceptions, see Jerrold Levinson, Intention and Interpretation: 
A Last Look, in INTENTION AND INTERPRETATION 221, 222–23 (Gary Iseminger ed., 1992); 
William E. Tolhurst, On What a Text Is and How It Means, 19 BRIT. J. AESTHETICS 3 (1979). 
 11. Knapp & Michaels, supra note 6, at 64. 
 12. Id. at 66. 
 13. Id. at 66–67. 




This passage clearly displays the assumption I am challenging.  First, it 
conflates utterance meaning—what “speech acts” mean—and speaker’s 
meaning.  The important question concerns the relationship between the 
conventions you use and the meaning of your speech act, and not the 
relationship between those conventions and “your meaning,” that is, the 
meaning you are attempting to express.  The question is whether, if you 
“use the wrong conventions” to express your intentions, the meaning of 
your speech act is different from the meaning you intended to express.  It 
is of course true that your meaning is not different from the meaning you 
intended to express: your meaning just is the meaning you intended to 
express, whether or not you succeeded in doing so.  But what about the 
meaning of your utterance?  Surely if you fail to express the meaning 
you intended to express, then the meaning you do express must be 
different from the meaning you intended.  And surely the meaning of 
your utterance—the meaning of your speech act—is the meaning you do 
express.14  (At one point in Against Theory, Knapp and Michaels write 
that “[m]eaning is just another name for expressed intention.”15  But an 
author’s expressed intention is not necessarily the intention he intended 
to express.)  Therefore, surely the meaning of your utterance can differ 
from the meaning you intended to express.  But if so, then strong 
intentionalism is false. 
A second feature of the lengthy passage quoted which displays the 
assumption I am challenging can be found in the reason Knapp and 
Michaels give for insisting that “your meaning doesn’t become a 
different meaning when you fail to express the meaning you intended.”  
That reason is given in the following sentence: “If it did, if speech acts 
were indeed conventional acts and not just acts that sometimes employ 
conventions, then Derrida would be right: intention would be inadequate 
to determine meaning.”  Now, this equates the view that Knapp and 
Michaels reject—the view that the meaning you express can differ from 
the meaning you intended to express—with conventionalism.  That 
equation is mistaken because it overlooks moderate intentionalism.  One 
can believe that use of the wrong conventions can give a speech act a 
meaning different from the speaker’s intended meaning, without being 
committed to the belief that the meaning of the speech act is determined 
entirely by conventions.  This is because of what Knapp and Michaels 
 14. I am using “express” here, as I take Knapp and Michaels to be using it, to 
include “imply.”  The distinction between express and implied meaning is irrelevant here. 
 15. Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, Against Theory, in AGAINST THEORY: 
LITERARY STUDIES AND THE NEW PRAGMATISM  11, 30 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed., 1985); see 
also id. at 21 (“[L]inguistic meaning is always identical to expressed intention.”); Knapp 
& Michaels, supra note 7, at 141 (“[O]ur position [regards] a text as the expression of its 
author’s intention . . . .”). 
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themselves concede, that what is essential to meaning are “clues” or 
“signals” of the speaker’s intentions, whether those clues consist of his 
apparent use of conventions or of something else.  If those clues do not 
help him express the meaning he intends—if he provides the wrong 
clues—then the meaning of his utterance differs from the meaning he 
intends.  This allows the moderate intentionalist to answer Knapp and 
Michaels’s rhetorical question, “if the interest of verbal meaning reduces 
to an interest in clues to what an author intends, what sense is there in 
appealing to the notion of verbal meaning as a way of going beyond 
authorial intention?”16  There is sense in such an appeal because what 
verbal meaning and other clues suggest an author intended may not be 
the same as what the author really intended, and utterance meaning is 
determined by the former rather than the latter. 
Knapp and Michaels consistently elide this distinction, as in the 
following passage: 
What Simon calls “contextual justification,” then, is nothing more than evidence 
of the author’s intention, and when we invoke context (as, I have argued, we 
always do) we are, by the same token, always invoking the author’s intention.17
Within a single sentence Michaels slides from “evidence of the author’s 
intention” to “the author’s intention,” without noticing the difference. 
Knapp and Michaels at one point acknowledge that speakers can fail 
to produce the speech act they intended to produce.  They write that, 
“You can intend to say something but fail to produce any sound at all, 
or . . . fail to produce the right sound.”18  But nothing comes of this because, 
as usual, they are thinking of their opponents as conventionalists, and the 
acknowledgement does not advance the cause of conventionalism.  They 
say that “neither of these failures has anything to do with convention; 
you have simply failed to do what you intended. . . .  The risk of such 
failures is essential not to conventional acts but to acts in general.”19  
That, of course, is true, but it does not vindicate strong intentionalism.  If 
by failing to produce the “right sound” someone can fail to utter sounds 
 16. Knapp & Michaels, supra note 6, at 57; see also Steven Knapp & Walter Benn 
Michaels, Intention, Identity, and the Constitution: A Response to David Hoy, in LEGAL 
HERMENEUTICS: HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE 187, 190, 192 (Gregory Leyh ed., 
1992). 
 17. Walter Benn Michaels, Response to Perry and Simon, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 673, 
676 (1985). 
 18. Knapp & Michaels, supra note 6, at 65. 
 19. Id. 




which mean what he intended them to mean, then the meaning of the 
sounds he utters—which is to say, the meaning of his utterance—is not 
what he intends it to be. 
In Against Theory 2, Knapp and Michaels discuss an example that 
Jonathan Culler took to demonstrate that the meaning of an utterance can 
differ from the meaning intended by the speaker.  Imagine that after 
apparently getting married, the groom claims that he was joking when he 
said “I do.”  Even if that really was his intention, Culler argued, it would 
not change the meaning of what he said in uttering those words: he made 
the requisite promise even if he did not intend to.20  Moderate intentionalists 
should agree with Culler on this point: because the meaning of the 
groom’s utterance is determined by evidence of his intended meaning 
that is readily available to his audience, then if when he said “I do” there 
was no evidence available to those present of his intention to make a 
joke, his utterance of those words did not constitute the making of a joke 
(not even a bad one).  At best, it constituted an attempt to make a joke. 
Knapp and Michaels deny that this is an example of the meaning of a 
speech act not being determined by the speaker’s intention.  But they 
agree that the groom should be held to have gotten married.  According 
to them, he is quite properly treated as if he made the requisite promise, 
even though he did not really do so.  People can justifiably be bound by 
promises they appear to make because otherwise contracts would be 
unenforceable: parties could always claim later that they did not really 
intend to enter into them, and it would be impossible to prove that they 
did.  In other words, Knapp and Michaels conclude, the reason for 
treating the groom as having gotten married is social, not linguistic: it 
has “nothing to do with the relation between meaning and intention.”21
This argument is not persuasive.  It may at least partly be motivated 
by their assumption that the only alternative to strong intentionalism is 
conventionalism.  They begin their discussion of the example by denying 
that the intentions of participants in marriage ceremonies are “in 
principle irrelevant,” because “[t]he whole point of a marriage ceremony 
is to provide a framework for declaring and carrying out certain 
intentions . . . .”22  But that would not be disputed by a moderate 
intentionalist who accepts Culler’s conclusion.  Of course the intentions 
of the participants are not irrelevant.  The point is that they are relevant 
only insofar as evidence of them is readily available to the participants’ 
intended audience, and in particular to those required by law to conduct 
and witness the marriage ceremony. 
 20. Id. at 63. 
 21. Id. at 64. 
 22. Id. at 63. 
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Knapp and Michaels’s distinction between social and linguistic reasons 
for holding the groom to be bound by his words is dubious.  The 
supposed social reason applies not only to contractual promises, but to 
the vast majority of utterances that people make.  It is generally, and not 
exceptionally, true that people are held responsible for what they appear 
to have said, regardless of what they may have intended to say.  
(Moderate intentionalists, of course, hold that what someone appears to 
have said, in the light of all the evidence readily available to his intended 
audience, is what he did say.)  That is ultimately due to the general 
social utility of clear communication, but it does not follow that it is due 
solely to “social reasons” rather than “linguistic” ones.23  Considerations 
of social utility have helped to shape our conception of what utterances 
mean.  We conceive of the meaning of utterances as something 
essentially public, and not, like desires, pains or other mental states, as 
something essentially private of which we can have only indirect 
evidence.  We do so partly because it is important for many practical 
purposes that utterances have meanings that are essentially public. 
In matters such as these, the ultimate court of appeal must be our 
linguistic judgments.  Because our language is a social artifact, constituted 
by our shared practices, there is nothing beyond them that can settle 
disagreement.  “[A]ll we have to go on is our use of language and such 
knowledge as we may possess about the conventions on which we 
rely . . . .”24  The question, then, is whether most people would agree 
with my judgment, which is that the groom not only appeared to make 
the promise, but did make it, even though he did not intend to.  I think 
they would.  It seems to me a commonplace that the meaning people 
intend to express or imply can differ from the meaning they in fact 
express or imply.  People can intend to say or imply something but fail 
to do so, and conversely, they can say or imply something they did not 
intend.  If we are told that we have misunderstood someone’s utterance, 
we often defend ourselves by replying “I now realize what she meant to 
say, but it’s not what she did say,” or “He may not have intended to say 
that, but he did.”  Knapp and Michaels would presumably deny that such 
replies can be strictly correct: if the meaning of someone’s words is 
 23. Knapp concedes this in Steven Knapp, Practice, Purpose, and Interpretive 
Controversy, in PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND SOCIETY 323, 334 (Michael Brint & William 
Weaver eds., 1991). 
 24. Ralph C.S. Walker, Conversational Implicatures, in MEANING, REFERENCE 
AND NECESSITY: NEW STUDIES IN SEMANTICS 133, 177 (Simon Blackburn ed., 1975). 
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identical to the meaning she intends them to have, then she can only 
appear to, but cannot really, say things which do not mean what she 
intends them to mean.  This strikes me, and I am confident would strike 
most people, as counterintuitive. 
IV.  INTENTIONLESS MEANINGS AND MEANINGLESS INTENTIONS 
Knapp and Michaels’s main argument against conventionalism is that 
marks do not mean anything if they were not made with the intention 
that they mean something, even if they resemble an utterance in every 
other respect.  Thus, suppose we find some marks that look like a word 
(say, “HELP” on a sandy beach), and the only evidence available to us 
suggests that they are in fact words, inscribed intentionally by someone 
in order to communicate something (for example, there are footprints 
leading to and from them).  In reality, however, the marks were not inscribed 
by anyone, but were produced by an unthinking, natural process (the 
presence of footprints is coincidental).  Knapp and Michaels would 
argue that the marks are really meaningless, even if the only evidence 
available to us suggests that they are not.  We are justified in believing 
that they are meaningful, but our belief is mistaken none the less.  For 
the sake of argument, I will assume that this argument is sound. 
But now consider the converse hypothetical.  We find some marks 
which bear some resemblance to a word, but the only evidence available 
to us suggests that they are meaningless, the product of an unthinking, 
natural process.  In reality, they were inscribed by someone intending to 
write the word that they resemble, in order to convey a message to us, 
not someone else whose language we are unable to recognize.  Do the 
marks really form that word, and have its meaning, or are they 
meaningless because, given the only evidence available to us, we are 
unable to regard them as meaningful? 
It might be argued that this hypothetical should be answered in the 
same way as the previous one.  Knapp and Michaels’s argument, which I 
am assuming is sound, is that meaninglessness is something objective, 
independent of the evidence we may have for ascertaining it.  If marks 
were not produced by a purposeful intelligence intending them to mean 
something, then they are meaningless whatever we may justifiably 
believe given the evidence available to us.  If we are prepared to believe 
this, it might be argued, we should also believe that whether marks are 
meaningful is also an objective fact independent of the evidence we, as 
their intended audience, may have for ascertaining it.  In other words, it 
might be argued that Knapp and Michaels’s principal argument against 
conventionalism does indeed support strong intentionalism, the thesis 
that the meaning of a text is its speaker’s meaning regardless of what 
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evidence of that meaning is available to his intended audience. 
But it seems to me that meaninglessness and meaningfulness differ in 
this respect, even if Knapp and Michaels are right about the former.  As 
for meaningfulness, someone who fails to produce something that his 
intended audience can recognize as meaningful, given the evidence 
readily available to it, fails to produce anything meaningful, notwithstanding 
his intention to do so. 
But how can there be a difference in this respect between meaninglessness 
and meaningfulness, which might seem to be opposite sides of the same 
coin?  The answer is that even if Knapp and Michaels’s principal argument 
is right, two necessary conditions must be satisfied for marks to be 
meaningful.  First, the marks must have been made by someone with the 
intention that they be meaningful;25 and secondly, her intended audience 
must be capable of recognizing that fact.  The failure of either of these 
two conditions makes marks meaningless.  Knapp and Michaels insist 
against conventionalists that the first condition is necessary, but it does 
not follow that it is also sufficient, for marks to be meaningful.  Marks 
made with the intention that they be meaningful are not meaningful 
unless the second condition is also satisfied.  But if the existence of an 
author who intends her text to have a meaning is only one of two 
necessary conditions for the text to have a meaning, then intended 
meaning and textual meaning are not identical, and strong intentionalism 
is false. 
Knapp and Michaels argue that there cannot be textual meaning 
without an intention to create it, but they do not seem to consider 
whether there can be an intention to create it that does not succeed.26  I 
have argued that even if there cannot be intentionless meanings, there 
can be meaningless intentions.  And if something intended to be 
meaningful can be meaningless, then for the same reasons, something 
intended to mean one thing can mean something else. 
 25. Or they must be suitably related to marks made by someone with the intention 
that they be meaningful.  For example, the marks you are reading were produced by a 
printing press, but they are suitably related to marks I made with the intention that they 
be meaningful.  See George M. Wilson, Again, Theory: On Speaker’s Meaning, Linguistic 
Meaning, and the Meaning of a Text, 19 CRITICAL INQUIRY 164, 168 n.4 (1992). 
 26. In arguing against theory, they say, “the only important question about 
intention is whether there can in fact be intentionless meanings.”  Knapp & Michaels, 
supra note 15, at 15. 




V.  MULTIPLE MEANINGS? 
Moderate intentionalism is the thesis that the meaning of an utterance 
is the meaning which evidence readily available to its intended audience 
suggests it was intended to mean.  An arguably counterintuitive 
consequence of this thesis is that an utterance may have more than one 
meaning, because different evidence of the speaker’s intended meaning 
may be available to different members of his intended audience. 
For example, if I intend a remark made during a conversation with 
Bob and Joe to be a joke, Bob might understand this but Joe might not.  
Joe might take it to be an insult, not through any fault of his, but because 
I failed to appreciate that he does not know me as well as Bob, and 
therefore needs more clues of my jocular intention.  According to the 
moderate intentionalist, my remark has two meanings: it means one 
thing in the case of Bob, and another in the case of Joe, because they do 
not have ready access to the same evidence of my intention.27
It may seem odd to think that the remark has two different meanings.  
Do we not intuitively feel that it really was a joke, which Bob was able to 
understand but Joe was not?  But if so, its meaning must be independent 
of the evidence available to its intended audience.  If the remark was a 
joke, regardless of Joe’s inability to recognize it as such, then presumably 
it would also have been a joke even if I had been conversing only with 
him: why should Bob’s presence make any difference?  But that would 
seem to vindicate strong intentionalism: the meaning of my utterance 
would be whatever I intended, regardless of the ability of my intended 
audience to ascertain that intention. 
On the other hand, is it so odd that an utterance might have more than one 
meaning?  That would surely be possible even if strong intentionalism were 
true, because I might have intended my remark as an insult to Joe and also, 
unknown to him, a joke for Bob’s amusement.28  Strong intentionalists hold 
that an utterance means what its speaker intends it to mean, and so if I 
intend an utterance simultaneously to convey different meanings to different 
people, they must hold that it has different meanings.29
 27. Moreover, if an utterance can have two different meanings at the time it is uttered, 
then it can have different meanings at different times.  A text might be correctly interpreted to 
mean one thing shortly after it is written, but something else a hundred years later when 
readers no longer know facts relevant to its interpretation.  In the case of a novel or a 
constitution, later readers are as much members of the text’s intended audience as earlier ones.  
So moderate intentionalism might support Gadamer against Knapp and Michaels, insofar as it 
endorses the notion that the meaning of a text can change over time. 
 28. This need not be a case of an express meaning being accompanied by an 
implication: both the joke and the insult might be implications. 
 29. Knapp and Michaels therefore seem to be mistaken to assert that “a text has 
only one meaning.”  Knapp & Michaels, supra note 6, at 68. 
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Seen in this light, the consequence that an utterance might have more 
than one meaning is less damaging to the plausibility of moderate 
intentionalism.  Admittedly, moderate intentionalists would be committed to 
the coexistence of different meanings more often than strong intentionalists, 
because differences in the evidence readily available to members of 
intended audiences are more common than deliberate multiple meanings.  
But that seems far from decisive in the contest between moderate and 
strong intentionalism.  It is just one consideration to be weighed against 
others, many of which, I have argued, favor moderate intentionalism. 
VI.  FOREIGN LANGUAGES AND PRIVATE CODES 
When I raised the possibility of moderate intentionalism at the 
Conference on Legal Interpretation, Michaels replied that if someone 
spoke in French to people who did not understand that language, the 
meaning of her utterance would be its meaning in French, even though 
evidence of that meaning would not be readily available to her 
intended audience.  It might seem to follow that if someone spoke in 
an idiolect to people who did not understand it, the meaning of his 
utterance would be its meaning in that idiolect, even though evidence 
of that meaning would not be readily available to his intended audience.  
It might then seem to follow that, contrary to the argument I have put 
forward here, the meaning of an utterance is independent of whether or 
not it is readily accessible by its intended audience, and therefore that 
strong intentionalism is vindicated. 
But if someone speaks to us in a language we do not understand, it is 
obvious to us that we do not understand it.  We reasonably suppose that 
it has a meaning, even though we do not immediately know what it is.  
(It is possible, of course, that we are the victims of a hoax, and that the 
utterance is really nonsense.)  Moreover, we can attempt to identify the 
language used, and if we succeed in doing so, to consult a dictionary or 
translator to ascertain the meaning of the utterance.  We are like people 
who must decipher a coded message, with the assistance of a manual 
that explains it.  Even the intended recipients of a coded message, and 
not just enemies who have intercepted it, may have to do so.  This is 
consistent with the definition of utterance meaning stipulated in Part II.  
Utterance meaning is “what the speaker’s meaning appears to be, given 
all the evidence that is readily available to his intended audience, which 
may include the sentence meaning of the utterance and other clues such 
as its context.”  In the case of a coded message, the evidence of its 




intended meaning—the manual—is readily available to its intended 
recipients. 
If a person speaks in a language that his intended audience does not 
understand, the audience will have to consult a dictionary or translator to 
decipher its meaning.  It might in some cases seem implausible to 
describe such assistance in ascertaining its meaning as “readily” 
available to the audience, but this is no different in principle from the 
use of a code.  Perhaps the criterion of “ready availability” needs to be 
relaxed in such cases.  But the need to seek such assistance would be 
obvious.  Members of the audience would know that the utterance had a 
meaning that was, temporarily, inaccessible or obscure to them. 
Cases of this kind stand in sharp contrast with the hypothetical case in 
which a person appears to speak to us in our own language, but later 
claims to have used a private code, and to have meant something 
entirely different from the meaning we reasonably attributed to his 
utterance.  Assume that at the time we interpret his utterance, there is 
no evidence whatsoever to alert us to his use of a private code.  When 
he later explains what, in his private code, he meant, we are entitled to 
reply that although this may have been what he meant, it was not the 
meaning of what he said.  The same is true, on a smaller scale, of an 
utterance that is in our language, but fails accurately to communicate 
the speaker’s meaning because (unbeknownst to us) he has misused the 
language, or for some other reason has failed to provide us with 
adequate evidence of his meaning.  In such cases it is also reasonable for 
us to say, “We now know what you meant, but that is not (the meaning 
of) what you said.” 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Knapp and Michaels are at best half right.  I have assumed that they 
are right to argue against conventionalists that a necessary condition for 
marks to have a meaning is that the marks be made by someone 
intending them to have it.  But they are nevertheless wrong to infer from 
this that the meaning of marks is identical to whatever meaning they 
were intended to have.  This is because the existence of an intended 
meaning, even if necessary, is not a sufficient condition for marks to 
have a meaning.  It follows that it is not a sufficient condition for the 
marks to have that particular meaning. 
In Alice in Wonderland, Humpty Dumpty says that his words mean 
whatever he intends them to mean.  Knapp and Michaels agree.30  Humpty 
 30. “The antiformalist point of ‘Against Theory’ is to insist that anything can be 
used to mean anything or, as Crewe rightly puts it, ‘quite radically to deny that the forms 
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and Knapp and Michaels are right, but only up to a point.  We can use 
words to mean whatever we intend them to mean, but only if our 
intended audience has sufficient nonverbal evidence of our intention to 
do so.  The problem is that the totality of the evidence available to our 
audience, verbal and nonverbal, cannot convey whatever we intend it to 
convey.  Because our audience must have evidence that it can understand, 
our attempt to convey our intentions is subject to constraints that must be 
respected if we are to succeed.  Those constraints determine the meaning of 
our utterances whatever our intentions might be. 
Moderate intentionalism lies somewhere between strong intentionalism 
and conventionalism.  It is able to explain why courts of law do not 
regard themselves as bound either by the literal (“sentence”) meanings 
of a statute, or by subjective intentions that legislators (even if they 
constitute a majority) failed to communicate to their intended audience.  
The courts seek to give effect to the objective meaning of a statute, 
which is informed both by the linguistic conventions that determine 
literal meanings, and by other evidence of the legislature’s intentions, 
provided that it is readily available to the statute’s intended audience.  
That other evidence can include common sense understandings of the 
legislature’s probable purposes and intentions, the historical circumstances 














of language possess any defining power.’”  Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, A 
Reply to Our Critics, in AGAINST THEORY: LITERARY STUDIES AND THE NEW PRAGMATISM, 
95, 104 n.6 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed., 1985); see also Knapp, supra note 23, at 323. 
 31. See also Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Legislative Intentions, Legislative Supremacy, 
and Legal Positivism, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 493 (2005). 
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